HomePropping up the image of the LTTE
While the Tamil political parties, having agreed among themselves on the need to prevent electoral violence in the run up to the local government polls, are wooing the voters, an attempt, a vain one at that, is made by some LTTE sympathisers to prop up the crumbling image of the LTTE in the north. The larger-than-life cut outs put up at every nook and corner of the peninsula in the hey day of the LTTE to lionise the dead leaders have all been pulled down and many a myths created by panegyrists about the LTTE has been destroyed. But in the refuge of the south, some pro-LTTE elements are making various claims in favour of the terrorists, the main being that they are as strong as ever. And far from the truth is their claim that the LTTE is not making a serious attempt to liquidate its opponents as feared because, having attained military supremacy (as manifest, they will say, in resilience the LTTE has shown in the face of the blitzkrieg that Operation Jayasikuru is) the LTTE is now striving to gain political legitimacy by making overtures to other Tamil parties.
If one is to go by these arguments, one would certainly end up being misled into believing that the LTTE has already achieved its military objectives despite successive military onslaughts by the government, and what it lacks at present is only political recognition and co-operation of others groups to sustain its Eelam.
Arguments of this nature are of some significance and provide an insight into the minds of Tiger sympathisers and encomiasts. The claim that the LTTE is making a serious effort to bring under its banner other Tamil groups and parties is no doubt an attempt to project the LTTE as an organisation capable of change, a change, as they claim, for better. This claim is intended to serve a number of purposes.
First, the Eelam lobbyists desperately need to have the US ban on the LTTE lifted as they are convinced that their legal wrangle against the US Government is only a shot in the dark. They cannot be unaware of the fact that it is very likely to backfire and if that happens the Tigers will be out of the frying-pan into the fire. Being more than a terrorist outfit that wants to commit suicide in Uncle Sam's courtyard, the LTTE, it could be seen, is trying to play it safe by helping its allies clear its name otherwise by playing the role of a liberation movement willing to accommodate other groups advocating more or less the same cause.
The LTTE knows that any attempt to disrupt Jaffna polls especially in the wake of the US ban, will only once again vindicate the Clinton administration that designated the LTTE a terrorist group, and bring upon it international opprobrium. It was only a few moons ago that the Canadian courts also held that the LTTE was a terrorist organisation. These political vicissitudes in the international arena, it could be seen, have made Prabhakaran shy of a course of action that would be condemned by the international community. Hence his hesitation to decimate the other Tamil groups in the fray in the peninsula.
Second, what prevents the LTTE going on a killing spree is its fear of devastating reprisals in the peninsula where it is hardly keeping its head above water. An all out effort to gun down the rivals will lead to a similar effort by others to help the military flush them out from the peninsula, a task that is not possible given the heavy concentration of other politico-military Tamil groups in Jaffna at present. It is believed that what makes this task difficult now is the fact that these Tamil groups are merely running with the hare and hunting with the hounds. Operation Jayasikuru is still on and it is highly unlikely that the government is prepared to stop short of achieving its objectives despite the fierce resistance of the LTTE.
Third, the re-opening of the MSR to the North will cause the LTTE numerous hitherto unknown problems, the main being that in such an eventuality, it will lose control of a strategically important stretch of land for the capture of which it had been fighting for nearly fifteen years and for the retention of which it has so far sacrificed about two thousand cadres and a great deal of resources.
Although the government troops too have suffered heavily in terms of both men and material, every kilometre they advance will seriously damage the LTTE's morale which is so essential for recruitment of cadres. Out of its desperate need for more men, the LTTE has already resorted to forcible conscription of teenagers as evident in the large number of boys between 12 and 15 killed in confrontations with the troops. Faced with this harsh reality and especially the fear of its terrain being severed into two right in the middle restricting if not preventing its hitherto easy movement between eastern and western Wanni across the highway in the aftermath of the conclusion of Jayasikuru, Prabhakaran, it is not difficult to see, does not want to have its rival Tamil groups too gunning for him at this hour of crisis.
Fourth, infiltration of the liberated areas alone will not enable the LTTE to foil the polls in the peninsula in the face of strong determination of the troops to keep the terrorists at bay. And the LTTE does not want to embark on an abortive mission in an area where it once suffered an ignominious defeat at the hands of the Riviresa troops, and expose its weakness to the rest of the world.
Fifth, paradoxically in India anti LTTE feelings are being whipped up by the very Congress that created, trained, armed and financed it. Widow of the late Premier Ganadhi is making her debut in Indian politics and is sure to turn the public opinion in favour of her party. This means another problem for the LTTE. Although the LTTE might be able to muster some support in Tamil Nadu, it is clear that at the centre its name will be tabooed. Worried about these developments, it could be argued, Prabhakaran does not want to go all out to disrupt the polls and to have other leaders killed simply because they are contesting the elections.
Another argument that has been put forth in favour of the LTTE at this hour of its crisis is that the revival of the local government bodies in the North will not be detrimental to the LTTE's ultimate goal because it is in a position to bring them under its control by influencing the members of these bodies in the due course. This is a fallacy, to say the least. For as is known to all, the revival of the political order in the north is sure to bring with it new hopes for the people.
With the democratisation of politics, the LTTE will have to wage a war of a different sort to win them back to its side. Peace on the other hand is anathema to a terrorist outfit like the LTTE and as its track record suggests it has always carefully seen to it that democratic politics does not come in its way. For example, they took the PA for a ride fearing the popular support President Kumaratunga commanded, at the beginning of the PA-LTTE honeymoon. The LTTE made every attempt to withdraw from the talks so as to gain some breathing space and to avoid a political dialogue as far as possible. It camouflaged, thanks to the PA's over-enthusiasm to continue a dialogue with them, their intention with the demand for reconstruction and rehabilitation. These talks, it should be recalled, though they failed, proved disastrous to the LTTE in terms of the sympathy the PA gained internationally and locally. This kind of sympathy placed the PA in a position to adopt what is termed a twin track approach to the conflict without being frowned upon by the international community.
It is also true that the government needs some achievement to preen itself on when the nation celebrates 50 years of "Independence" early next month and the Jaffna polls are intended to serve that purpose. Independence Day celebrations are to be followed a little later by provincial council elections, and the Jaffna polls will be one of the main planks of the PA election platform. Hence, the opposition to the polls from the Opposition.
However, the politics of the polls notwithstanding, the fact remains that the elections aimed at reviving democracy in the north are a move that has the potential to politically checkmate Prabhakaran – at least in the north.
This article was taken from "The Island" [10 January 1998], Author: Prabath Sahabandu