Tamil Separatism and the "Thimpu principles"

At the Thimpu talks held in Bhutan in 1985, the Tamil delegation consisting of TULF, LTTE, PLOTE, EROS, and EPRLF issued the following statement:

"It is our considered view that any meaningful solution to the Tamil national question must be based on the following four cardinal principles:

1. Recognition of the Tamils of Sri Lanka as a nation.

2. Recognition of the existence of an identified homeland for Tamils in Sri Lanka.

3. Recognition of the right of self-determination of the Tamil nations.

4. Recognition of the right to citizenship and the fundamental rights of the Tamils who look upon the
island as their country."

Let us examine each of these four assertions.

1. "Tamils of Sri Lanka are a Nation"

The concept of 'nation' used by the Tamil separatist movement is borrowed from the west. In the west the word 'nation' initially was used to form the sovereign states of Europe, as we know them today. But the word is also used today by ethnic groups within these sovereign states, in their demands for autonomy, self-rule, and secession. Anthony D. Smith dates this eruption of ethnic conflicts and assertions of 'Nationhood' to the 1950s. (Smith P 20.) Smith declares "Nowhere has the ethnic revival occasioned more surprise than in its European heartlands, and nowhere has there been such a proliferation of ethnic movements in the last two decades." He gives the following incomplete list of European communities who seek autonomy: Scots, Welsh, Breton, Corsican, Basque, Catalan, Flemish, Ulster, Tyrolese, Croat, Slovak, Greek, Cypriot, Maltese, Quebecois, Jurassien, Galicians, Andalusian, Cornish, Manx, Faroese, Shetlanders, Channel Islanders, Frisians, Gelderlanders, Walloons, Sardinians, Sicilians, Slovenes, Alsations, Occitanians, Bavarians, Lithuanians, Czechs, Poles, Bulgarians, Armenians. (Anthony. D. Smith. "The Ethnic Revival" 1981, p 13,69, 163) I have given this long list to indicate the extent of the phenomenon in Europe.

The vast contemporary literature on ethnic movement in Europe is due essentially to the importance of such movements in Europe. Think of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the mess in Bosnia-Serbia-Yugoslavia-Kosovo. Certain academics have selected the ethnic movements as their field of specialisation, and have provided various theories about them. Writers such as Kedourie, Gellner, Connor and A. D. Smith belong to this category. Their explanation as to ethnic movements in Europe are based on the weaknesses of the industrial society, and the centralised political state. These analyses are not relevant to Sri Lanka.

However, their analysis of the various strategies used by these ethnic movements, is extremely relevant. I will indicate why later. These writers have attempted to outline the various strategies used by the European ethnic groups to obtain power. They point out that modern ethnic nationalisms have had to ground their aspirations in arguments appealing to general principles like popular sovereignty, inalienable rights and cultural diversity. (Smith p xiii) They refer to the utilisation of 'culture markers' particularly language. Smith says "One of nationalisms abiding myths is the identification of nationality with language." He traces this myth to the 18 century notions of the emotional power of language developed in France and Germany. (Smith p 45) Smith further points out that in most cases, the notion of ethnic identity was created by the intellectuals of that ethnic group. The masses generally did not generate ethnic movements. The intellectuals did. (Smith p 68) Smith further observes that ethnic communities usually 'possess' a recognised territory, with which they are habitually associated. Ethnic groups also often display a jealous and deep rooted attachment to particular areas or regions within one or more plural states. "A nation without its homeland is almost unthinkable'. (Smith p 63)

All this will sound very familiar to Sri Lanka public, who have listened to these arguments by the Tamil separatist movement, over and over again. It will be apparent now that the Tamil separatist movement has borrowed all of its assertions from the European cases. The ideology of the Tamil separatist movement is totally devoid of any original ideas. They simply use the European arguments, and their terminology. Virtually all the words and phrases used come from the west. This includes statements as to the 'right to be different', the need to express" identity." These European movements, are defined by Anthony, D. Smith as 'social groups whose members share a sense of common origin, claim a common and distinctive history and destiny, possess one or more distinctive characteristics, and feel a sense of collective uniqueness and solidarity" (Smith p 66) The Tamil separatist assertions are built around these variables.

This concept of 'nation' is relatively new in Europe. Not more than 200 years old. On the other hand, a different concept of 'nation' in terms of an independent, sovereign state, has been in existence for centuries in Asia. Asia developed centralised, monarchical states very early on, approximately around 4. B.C. Sri Lanka was recognised as one such sovereign, independent state from very early on. It sent an embassy to Rome. Other Asian countries, such as China, Burma, India recognised the monarch in Sri Lanka.

After the South Indian invasions of the 10th to 13 century, Sri Lanka again emerged as a 'nation'. The area under the actual control of the consecrated king got smaller and smaller, and half a dozen people were ruling at the same time, in different parts of the island, but the concept of a single consecrated king yet remained. Buvanekabahu I (1272-84) once sent a message to the Sultan of Egypt, offering to trade with pearls, elephants etc. He stated that the pearl fishery in Mannar was his, when in fact the Arya Chakravarti king of Jaffna had got hold of the fisheries at the time. (Gunasinghe. "The political history of YapahuwaE" p 76-77) The Portuguese got the Kotte king consecrated in Protugal, but did not do the same for the king in Jaffna. Portugal, Netherlands, and Britain were obliged to recognise the Sri Lanka king, though he was usually holed up in segment of the island.

The Tamils of Sri Lanka were not a 'nation' in the Asian sense of a political state. The Kingdom of Jaffna was too small, too shortlived, and too weak to sustain such an idea. Also the western concept of Tamils as a 'nation' clashes with the Asian concept of Sri Lanka as a 'nation'. It is not possible to have a 'nation' within another 'nation'.

Now let us return to the European concept of 'nation'. E. J. Hobsbaum has taken a critical and mildly sarcastic look at the concept as it functioned in Europe, in his book "Nations and nationalism since 1780" (1990). He points out that the word 'nation' belongs to one period of European history. Its use in the modern political sense is quite new. (p 18) Initially it was held that self determination could only apply to viable units, and that a nation should be of a certain optimum size, so that it could enjoy the economic benefits of a large state. This was known as the 'threshold principle'. (p 31) Nation building was seen as a process of expansion, not contraction into divisive small units. (P 33) Initially, the 'nation states' of Europe, such as Britain, France, and Spain were heterogeneous. They were multilingual, multiethnic because in Europe, the people were utterly mixed and it was impossible to unscramble them. This was due to various invasions of tribes from Scandinavia and West Asia in medieval times. Thus Mazzini remarked, after the Unification of Italy, "We have made Italy, now we must make Italians". Pilsudski, the Polish leader, said that it is the state which makes the nation, not the other way round. (p 44) And during this time, around 1870, many small communal groups sought assimilation into the 'nation state' (p 93)

Hobsbaum looks at the definition of a 'nation'. He points out that the word is today used so widely and imprecisely that a definition is difficult. He says The objective definitions have failed, since they do not include all cases. The subjective definitions are worse. Therefore it is not clear as to how we distinguish a 'nation'. Criteria given are usually common language, common territory, common history, common culture. Hobsbaum states that the best known of all the available definitions is perhaps that of Stalin, written in 1912. 'A nation is a historically evolved, stable, community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make up manifested in a community of culture' (p 5) Hobsbaum points out that the criteria used, such as language, ethnicity etc. are themselves fuzzy, shifting and ambiguous, and useless for the purpose. (P 6)

In Europe, national movements were first of all simply cultural, literary, folkloristic. Then they turned into a political campaign, and thereafter into a mass movement. In the process the word 'nation' was used in all sorts of different ways, one of which was to equate it with the democratic ideals of the American and French nation specially after the French Revolution expounded its principles in 1789.

The words 'National question' came up with the break up of the Austro-Hungary Empire and the Ottoman Empire, prior to 1914. Further, a practice of having a National censes at state level National was begun after 1853. It was decided to include questions on an individual's nationality, language, and race in this National Census, thus further emphasising these variables. (P 101)

Colonial movements picked up the language of European nationalism. "The leaders and ideologies of colonial and semi-colonial liberation movements sincerely spoke the language of European nationalism, which they had so often learned from the west, even when it did not suit their situation. And as the radicalism of the Russian Revolution took over from that of the French Revolution as the main ideology of global emancipation, the right to self-determination, now embodied in Stalin's texts, reached those who had been beyond the range of Mazzini. Liberation in the Third World was now seen everywhere as 'national liberation' or among the Marxists, 'national and social liberation'."(136)

The post colonial 'nation state' is a very central and powerful factor in its peoples lives. Hobsbaum says Ethnic and language communities, that is; cultural groups, are resentful of the homogenised, standardised tendencies of the centralised state, with its emphasis on macro-economic planning. Hobsbaum concludes his review of nations and nationalisms by pointing out that in the late 20th century, the concept of nations has been over taken by the idea of regions, and supra national groupings like the European Community. (p 182)

It will be clear now, that the Tamil separatist idea of a 'nation' is heavily based on the European one. It has borrowed arguments such as the centralised state, central economic planning in its current propaganda. In fact every phrase uttered by the Tamil separatist movement can be found in the western texts.

They have read them carefully, and borrowed heavily.

E. J. Hobsbaum's book 'Nations and Nationalism since 1780" has benefited from discussion with other scholars. Hobsbaum specially singles out Kumari Jayewardene and the other South Asian Scholars at the World Institute for Development Economy in Helsinki. (WIDER). (pvii) His reference for the

Sinhala-Tamil conflict in Sri Lanka are: Kumari Jayewardene's "Ethnic and class conflicts in Sri Lanka", Uyangoda's" Reinterpreting Tamil and Sinhala nationalism", R. N. Kearney's 'Ethnic conflict and Tamil separatist movement in Sri Lanka", Sunil Bastian's "University admissions" and Charles Abeysekera's "Ethnic representation in the state services' both published in the book "Ethnicity and Social Change in Sri Lanka" issued by Social Scientists Association. (P 153, 158)

Despite this Hobsbaum is not taken in by the utterances of the Tamil separatist movement. Here is his assessment of the situation in Sri Lanka: (p6) he quotes from an ITAK document,

"The Tamil-speaking people in Ceylon constitute a nation district from that of the Singalese by every fundamental test of nationhood, firstly that of a separate historical past in the island at least as ancient and as glorious as that of the Singalese [sic], secondly by the fact of their being a linguistic entity entirely different from that of the Sinhalese, with an unsurpassed classical heritage and a modern development of language which makes Tamil fully adequate for all present-day needs and finally by reason of their territorial habitation of definite areas".

The purpose of this passage is clear: it is to demand autonomy or independence for an area described es 'over one third of the island' of Sri Lanka, on grounds of Tamil nationalism. Nothing else about it is as it seems. It obscures the fact that the territorial habitation consists of two geographically separate areas inhabited by Tamil speakers of different origins (indigenous and recent Indian immigrant labour respectively); that the area of continuous Tamil settlement is also, in certain zones, inhabited by anything up to a third of Sinhalese and anything up to 4I% of Tamil speakers who refused to consider themselves national Tamils and prefer identif cation as Muslims (the 'Moors'). In fact, even leaving aside the central region of immigrants, it is not at all clear that the territory of major continuous Tamil settlement, comprising as it does areas of solid Tamil settlement (from 71 to 95% - Batticaloa, Mullaitivu, Jaffna) and areas where self-identified Tamils form 20 or 33% (Ampara, Trincomalee) should be described, except in purely cartographic terms, as a single space. In fact, in the negotiations which led to the end of the Sri Lankan civil war in 1987, the decision to do so was a straightforward political concession to the demands of the Tamil nationalists.

As we have already seen the 'linguistic entity' conceals the unquestionable fact that indigenous Tamils, immigrant Indians and Moors are - so far - a homogeneous population in no other than the philological sense, and, as we shall see, probably not even in this sense. As for the 'separate historical past', the phrase is almost certainly anachronistic, question-begging or so vague as to be meaningless. It may, of course, be objected that patently propagandist manifestos should not be scrutinized as though they were contributions to the social sciences, but the point is that almost any classification of some community as a 'nation' on the grounds of such purportedly objective criteria would be open to similar objections; unless the fact that it was a 'nation' could be established on other grounds.

2. TAMIL HOMELAND.

This brings us to the second of the Thimpu principles - recognition of the existence of an identified homeland. This 'homeland' concept is taken from the European ethnic movements. 'Foxwatch' points out that the Tamils who lobbied Britain during the independence discussions in the 1940s said nothing about a Tamil homeland. If indeed there had been a natural homeland, it would have emerged during the Soulbury Commission investigations in 1944. The homeland argument was not made, simply because the 'homeland' argument had not yet come into existence. (Island 4.10.98 p9) K. M. de Silva has conclusively demonstrated that the notion of a Tamil homeland is a myth, a deliberately concocted myth. Sri Lanka Tamils have no extensive territory over which they ruled. There are just three pockets of Tamil settlements, Jaffna, Batticaloa and Colombo, with about half of the Tamil population living scattered in the rest of the country. The Jaffna settlements only arose in the 13th century, those of Batticaloa have been dated 16th to 18 century, while the Colombo settlements is in the 20th century. Further, the Thimpu principle's do not specifically state where this identified homeland is. There have been continuous migration of South Indians over the centuries. They came from present day Kerala, Tamilnadu and Andhra Pradesh, the three Indian states closest to Sri Lanka. They came as soldiers traders, invaders, plunderers, and as peaceful immigrants. None of these categories, except the invaders, could lead to a 'homeland'. The rest integration and assimilation into the Sri Lankan community. Further, the Sri Lankan Tamil are just one of several minorities, together with the Burghers, Moors, Malays, 'Colombo Chetty', Barathas, Chinese., SELF DETERMINATION. The term 'self determination' was popularised by Woodrow Wilson, President of the USA from 1913-1921 and head of the League of Nations. The League of Nations was in existence from 1919 - 1946 and was the basis for the later United Nations Organisation. The idea of 'self determination 'was first expounded in the League of Nations, and was taken up by the UN. It is included in the UN Declaration of Human Rights, which says that all peoples are entitled to self determination. Therefore the key question was who are the 'people'. The UN subsequently was obliged to provide a definition. It defined the 'people entitled to 'self determination' were those living under colonial rule. People in sovereign states which were democratically ruled, were not entitled to further 'self determination'. This decision was taken in two General Assembly rulings. These are: "UN General Assembly Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial countries and People's (1960) and the UN General Assembly Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning Friendly relations among States" (1970). These declarations affirmed the territorial unity of sovereign states. The 'self determination' principle should not be interpreted in such a manner as to dismember the territory or political unity of sovereign states, which were conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights, and had a government which represented the whole people with no distinction as to race, creed or colour.

Patrick Thornberry, examining the position for the London based Minority Rights Group, concluded that 'self determination is not a right of minorities'. Minorities could share in self determination only with the rest of the population. Thornberry next argues that the term 'peoples' as defined by the UN can therefore apply only to the majority within the state. 'There is little in this definition for inorities'. Thornberry's last observation could be contested. The collective exercise of 'self determination' of a whole population cannot be interpreted as the exclusive right of a 'majority'. He does not define 'majority'. The majority here would be a simple numerical majority of votes, which could be composed of the votes of all ethnic groups. (P. Thornberry. "Minorities and Human Rights Law' 1991. p9-10)

The United Nations has examined the position as regard the 'self determination' of minorities recently. The Sub-Commission on Prevention, Discrimination, and Protection of Minorities, requested a special report on the matter by Asbjorn Eide. This report titled "Protection of Minorities', dated 10.8.93. Document No. E/CN.4 Sub.2/1993/34 Eide examines the position of minorities in sovereign states, with democratically elected governments.

Eide begins by announcing that 'when a minority group lives compactly together in part of the territory of a sovereign state, its representatives sometimes claim that the group constitutes a people, or nation and on that basis is entitled to self-determination.'Eide examines their relevant UN discussions, and conclude that the word 'people' as used in the UN declaration means the 'permanent, resident population of the territory, not the separate ethnic or religious groups, whether dominant or not in that territory' (p17) Eide points out that over the years, interested parties gave exaggerated and misconceived interpretations to the right of self determination. He emphasises that this announcement of the right of self determination has led to acts of violence and aggression, based on vague and elusive interpretations of this right. Eide suggests that the statement issued last of all, by Vienna Declaration of 1993 could be considered conclusive.

Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 1993, stated as follows in section 1.2:

"In accordance with the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, this shall not be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent Statesconducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and thus possessed of a Government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind"

Eide points out that the Vienna Declaration confirms the UN position given in 1966 and 1970. The UN is firm on its stand that it will not advocate the dismemberment of sovereign states which are member states of the UN. Eide makes the following observation regards the Vienna Declaration. The sovereign state should possess a government which represents the people in the territory without distinction of any kind.

If members of a group living either compactly together in an administrative unit of the State or dispersed within the territory of a sovereign State claim that the State is not possessed of a Government representing the whole people without distinction, this claim can be examined at the international level, either by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in connection with its examination of the State's report, since discrimination in political rights on ethnic grounds is covered by the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, article 5, or by the Human Rights Committee. If the State is a member of the Council of Europe, it could also be addressed under article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights in conjunction with Protocol 1. In such cases, the remedy will have to be that the discrimination is brought to an end and that the Government is made truly representative, by allowing for participation in the political process on a basis of equality of all members of the group.

"Only if the representatives of the group concerned can prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is no prospect within the foreseeable future that the Government will become representative of the whole people, can it be entitled to demand and to receive support for a quest for independence. If it can be shown that the majority is pursuing a policy of genocide against the group, this must be seen as very strong support for the claim of independence. The mere fact of there being ethnic violence between the majority and minority does not prove that there is an intent to destroy the group as such, in whole or in part. Even if there was, it would still have to be shown that the majority side was more responsible than the minority for the acts of violence taking place. Unfortunately, when violence has reached such levels, there is at present no machinery at the international level to which the aggrieved party can turn for an impartial finding.

"Special problems arise when a part of the settled residents of the country having an ethnic, linguistic or religious identity different from that of the majority is denied citizenship. This effectively blocks that group from participating in the political processes and could be a strong indicator that the Government is not representative of the whole people. In this situation also however, the primary effort should be to ensure that they obtain citizenship, rather than secession.

New States can of course still emerge through the peaceful and consensual subdivision of existing sovereign States. Borders can also be changed by agreement between the parties, obtained without duress. There is, however, no unilateral right under international law for groups to obtain such subdivision or border changes except under the conditions mentioned above. Changes arising from peaceful negotiations, free of acts of aggression or external intervention, are obviously in conformity
with international law.

"The United Nations has not closed its door. Yet if every ethnic, religious or linguistic group claimed statehood, there would be no limit to fragmentation, and peace. Security and economic well-being for all would become ever more difficult to achieve ... . The sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of States within the established international system, and the principle of self-determination for peoples, both of great value and importance, must not be permitted to work against each other in the period ahead. Respect for democratic principles at all levels of social existence is crucial: in communities, within States and within the community of States. Our constant duty should be to maintain the integrity of each while finding a balanced design for all.''

Eide also discusses the possibility of 'internal self determination". It is possible that groups living within sovereign states do have a right self-determination short of secession. Eide argues that this is limited to the right to vote. Eide points out that there is no firm indication that groups have a right to local self government or autonomy within the state, on the basis of the right of self determination. He suggests that this may be possible in the case of groups with historical record of self rule, such as pre-existing autonomy within union republics of dissolved federal states. (p19)

4. Citizenship rights of Tamils

The fourth principle in the Thimpu declaration contradicts the first three statements! If the Tamils are a separate nation, with a separate homeland, and are entitled to self-determination, then why ask to be treated also as citizens of the larger unit of Sri Lanka. In this last item we are told that the Tamil 'nation' also look upon the island as their country, according to the homeland clause they don't. This is of course, the usual careless writing one associates with the Tamils separatist movements. What it means is that while some Tamil, have a homeland, others can however opt to be citizens of the larger unit of Sri Lanka. They probably mean the Estate Tamils.

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